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MobiLogLeak: A Study on Data Leakage  
Caused by Poor Logging Practices 
Rui Zhou 
Logging is an essential software practice that is used by developers to debug, diagnose and audit 
software systems. Despite the advantages of logging, poor logging practices can potentially leak 
sensitive data. The problem of data leakage is more severe in applications that run on mobile 
devices, since these devices carry sensitive identification information ranging from physical 
device identifiers (e.g., IMEI MAC address) to communications network identifiers (e.g., SIM, IP, 
Bluetooth ID), and application-specific identifiers related to the location and accounts of users. 
This study explores the impact of logging practices on data leakage of such sensitive information. 
Particularly, we want to investigate whether logs inserted into an application code could lead to 
data leakage. While studying logging practices in mobile applications is an active research area, 
to our knowledge, this is the first study that explores the interplay between logging and security in 
the context of mobile applications for Android. We propose an approach called MobiLogLeak that 
identifies log statements in deployed apps that leak sensitive data. MobiLogLeak relies on taint 
flow analysis. Among 5,000 Android apps that we studied, we found that 200 apps leak sensitive 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Objective 
Software logging is an important software development practice used by developers to gain insight 
into the behavior of software systems are run-time [Miranskky 16, Zhu 15]. Log messages printed 
during the execution of a program are often the only data source available for developers to 
diagnose program failures [Khatuya 18], detect vulnerabilities and malware infections [Yen 13], 
detection of system anomalies [Islam 18], etc. Developers of mobile applications (apps), the focus 
of this thesis, also use logging to keep track of important events that can help them debug problems 
later.  Despite the importance of log data, the practice of logging is still largely ad hoc and 
somewhat arbitrary [Chen 17b].  
There exist studies that examine the practice of logging in mobile app development with a focus 
on examining the pervasiveness of logging in traditional and mobile applications, the evolution of 
logging, logging anti-patterns and bed smells, etc. For examples, Yuan et al. [Yuan 2012a] 
conducted an empirical study on the logging practices in four open source C++ software projects 
and obtained ten interesting findings on the logging practices. A replication study was conducted 
by Chen et al. [Chen 17a] focusing on Java systems. The authors examined the logging practices 
in 21 Java projects from the Apache Software Foundation [ASF 16].  
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In this thesis, we argue that poor logging practices may lead to more serious problems than quality 
issues such as exposing user private and personal information and other sensitive data. While 
studying logging practices in mobile apps is an active research area, to our knowledge, this is the 
first study that explores the interplay between logging and security (more precisely data privacy) 
in the context of mobile applications for Android. 
Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 – Background 
This chapter introduces the technologies we used in our thesis. In the first section, we introduce 
the fundamentals of Android framework. We explain the four main Android components. Then, 
we review the concept of logging in Android apps. In the second section, we summarize previous 
work related to the practice of logging in software development. The chapter continues with a 
detailed literature review, followed by a general discussion.  
Chapter 3 - MobiLogLeak Approach 
In this chapter, we present our approach, called MobiLogLeak, for detecting logs in Android apps 
that can be a source of data leakage. We start the chapter with an overview of the approach and 





Chapter 4 - Evaluation 
In this chapter, we show the effectiveness of MobiLogLeak when applied to more than 5,000 apps. 
We discuss the main results and conclude with lessons learned. 
Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
In this chapter, we revisit the main contributions of this thesis. We conclude with comments about 
our project and some opportunities for future research. 
Related publications 
 Rui Zhou, Mohammad Hamdaqa, Haipeng Cai, and Abdelwahab Hamou-
Lhadj, "MobiLogLeak: A preliminary study on data leakage caused by poor logging 
practices," In: Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Software Analysis, 





Chapter 2 - Background  
 
Android Architecture 
Figure 2.1 shows the typical Android development process. Android development is mainly in 
Java, Kotlin, and C++.  After implementing the functionalities of the app, the code is compiled by 
the Android SDK (Software Development Kit). The result is an archive file with apk extension, 
which can then be deployed on an Android device.  
 
 




Figure 2.2 Android Components 
Android applications have different categories of components that may depend on each other. As 
shown in Figure 2.2, an Android app can have Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, and 
Content Providers [Android 17]. Each component has its own lifecycle, which defines the 
functions to create, start, pause, restart, and end the component.   
Activity: The Activity component is used to represent the app user interface. Each screen or page 
in the app is associated to one activity. Android supports various layouts that enable developers to 
create powerful user interface capabilities.  
Service: The Service component is used to implement services that run in the background such 
downloading a large file, playing background music, etc. Services do not require user interaction 
and hence do not necessitate a user interface.  
Broadcast Receivers: The Broadcast Receiver component is used when the app needs to receive 
events from other apps. In some cases, even though the app is not running in the background, the 
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system could still send the broadcasts from other apps to it. For instance, some Android apps could 
set notifications to users in order to remind them of important events.  
Content Provider: The content Provider is used to access the data in the file system. This data 
may be located in a database, XML file, or stored on remote storage devices.  
Logging in Android Development 
A logging statement is typically composed of an object, a verbosity level, a static text, and/or a 
dynamic content. An example of a logging statement is shown in Listing 1, “Log” is the object. 
“info” is the verbosity level, which means information, and “log statement” is the static text. A 
dynamic content could refer to variables (not shown in this example). 
Log.info("log statement");   
Staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int info(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)> ("log statement"); 
Listing 1. Log Message Example 
The object is provided by the class android.util.Log. It is the default logging library for Android. 
Similar to the print statement (e.g. System.out.print), log messages will appear in the backend 
terminal when the program executes the statement. However, the default logging library does not 
support any formatting capabilities, making it difficult for developer to process the resulting log 
files. It just shows the value of its parameters. This is why many developers prefer to import other 
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advanced logging libraries such as Timber1, ZLog2, Logger3, which provide better formatting 
features than the standard logging library, hence facilitating post-mortem analysis of log messages. 
For example, these libraries use different coloring schemes to distinguish among various verbosity 
levels.  
Even though there exist many logging libraries in Android, most of them support five verbosity 
level: Log.v(), Log.d(), Log.i(), Log.w() and Log.e(), which stand for VERBOSE, DEBUG, INFO, 
WARN, ERROR. Among these levels, the Verbose and Debug verbosity levels should only be 
used during development to help developers debug their programs before releasing them. On the 
other hand, the Info, Warn and Error log messages are part of the program after deployment.  
The static text and dynamic content are used by developers to output information about the 
program. In most cases, this information is used for debugging, which helps check errors and their 
causes. This explains why the majority of logging statements are usually found in try/catch blocks, 
for printing exceptions and error messages. In addition, we found that in Android development, 
developers tend to insert logging statements before the start of services to help monitor the 
execution of services. In addition, logs help the developers to understand the code and check the 
performance of as system [Zeng 19]. For example, in Listing 2, the log statement in Line 22 outputs 
variable $r3, which refers to variable $r1 (shown in Line 20) of type is TimeUnit. Also, $r3 
includes the static text, “Closing connections idle longer than”. From this text, we can see that 






variable $r1 is sued to measure the time of closing connections; this information can be used to 
analyze the performance of the program.  
Class: org.apache.http.impl.conn.PoolingHttpClientConnectionManager   
1. public void closeIdleConnections(long, java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit)   
2. {   
3.     org.apache.http.impl.conn.PoolingHttpClientConnectionManager $r0;   
4.     long $l0;   
5.     java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit $r1;   
6.     boolean $z0;   
7.     java.lang.StringBuilder $r2;   
8.     java.lang.String $r3;   
9.     org.apache.http.impl.conn.CPool $r4;   
10.     $r0 := @this: org.apache.http.impl.conn.PoolingHttpClientConnectionManager;   
11.     $l0 := @parameter0: long;   
12.     $r1 := @parameter1: java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;   
13.     $z0 = staticinvoke <android.util.Log: boolean isLoggable(java.lang.String,int)>("HttpClient", 3);   
14.     if $z0 == 0 goto label1;   
15.     $r2 = new java.lang.StringBuilder;   
16.     specialinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>();   
17.     $r2 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>("Closing c
onnections idle longer than ");   
18.     $r2 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(long)>($l0);   
19.     $r2 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>(" ");   
20.     $r2 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.Object)>($r1);   
21.     $r3 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String toString()>();   
22.     staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("HttpClient", $r3);   
23.  label1:   
24.     ... 
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25.     return;   
26. } 
Listing 2: Performance Example 
App developers use different local directories to store log information including “/data/local/tmp/”, 
“/data/tmp/”, etc. Normally, the app developers use Logcat or ADB (Android Debug Bridge) to 
retrieved and process logs. These tools can get the logs by checking the libraries “/dev/log/main”. 
Literature Review of Existing Log Analysis Studies  
2.3.1 Logging practices 
Yuan et al. [Yuan 12a] surveyed the logging practices in four open-source projects. They deep 
analyzed which parts of logging code cost developers’ most of time to fix. To achieve this 
objective, they build a prototype with some recurring error patterns to evaluate the feasibility of 
anticipating the introduction of problematic logging code. In addition, they provide a simple 
checker which could detect unknown problematic logging statements and confirmed the feasibility 
of leveraging historical data to improve logging code.  
Chen et al. [Chen 17a] conducted a study focusing on Java systems. The authors examined the 
logging practices in 21 Java projects from the Apache Software Foundation. They addressed five 
questions related to logging pervasiveness, bug reports, log modification, characteristics of 
consistent updates and after-thought updates. They set several criteria to filter the log statements 
and calculated the log density, logging insertion, log deletion, log move, and log update. Their 




Zeng et al. [Zeng 19] conducted a research study on the characteristics of logging practices in 
1,444 open source mobile apps from the F-droid repository [F-Droid 17]. They checked the 
logging density, rational behind logging, and performance impact. The authors compared the 
results to two previous studies [Yuan 12a] [Chen 17a] focusing on C++ and Java applications. 
They found that logs are less in mobile apps than in server and desktop traditional software projects. 
Then, they identified several reasons why developers put the log statements in the code: Debug, 
Anomaly detection, assisting in development, bookkeeping, performance, change for consistency, 
customized logging library and from third-party library.  
Shang et al. [Shang 14] proposed an approach where they used the development knowledge to 
help understand the meaning and impact of each specific lines. The approach starts by examining 
the email threats from Hadoop, Cassandra and Zookeeper. They spend 100 hours on manually 
detection, and they found 15 email inquires and 73 inquires from web research. Then, they 
summarized five types of development knowledge which are applied a lot in industry, including 
meaning, cause, context, impact and solution, to help understand log lines in code commits, issue 
reports and other development repositories. In conclusion, they argued it’s feasible to use the 
derived development knowledge to resolve the real-life log inquires. 
In another study, Pecchia et al. [Pecchia 15] surveyed the event logging practices in the area of 
critical industrial development. They corporated with Selex ES, a company focus on electronic 
and information solutions for critical system. They want to answer: how do developers work? Why 
do developers work? How do industry practices impact event logging? They did the experiment 
by accessing the source code of software, inspecting about 2.3 million log entries and getting the 
feedback directly from the development team. Their research contains programming practices, 
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logging objectives and issue impacting log analysis. They get 7 findings from their analysis and 
their work contribute a lot to improve the event logging reengineering tasks at Selex ES. 
Fu et al. [Fu 14] run a study with Microsoft developers to investigate where software developers 
put log statement in industrial systems. The study focuses on three research questions: What 
categories of code snippets are logged? What factors are considered for logging? Is it possible to 
automatically determine where to log? In their experiment, they accessed the source code of 2 
Microsoft systems. Also, they used a questionnaire survey with 54 experienced Microsoft 
developers. They proposed six patterns of where the logging statements are located, and their 
prediction accuracy is up to 90% F-Score. Their results suggest that it is feasible to predict the 
logging statement location using a classification model. 
Another study was conducted by Li et al. [Li 17a], where the authors proposed suggestions to 
developers for better classification of new log statements with a focus on log levels. Normally, log 
levels include fatal, debug, info, warn and error. However, in their studies, software developers 
often have problems deciding which level they should give to the new statements. Therefore, they 
investigated the development history of Hadoop, Directory Server, Hama and Qpid to survey the 
log level practices and build a classifier that predict the adequate log level based on historical data.  
2.3.2 Quality of Logs 
Cinque et al. [Cinque 10] proposed an approach to prove the effectiveness of log statement when 
software fault. They used the G-SWFIT technique [Durase 06], which could inject faults to 
applications, to cause the failure of tested software. Then, they check the log files which keep track 
of this problems and verify whether the log files could help detect the faults and help resolve them. 
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They tested Apache server, TAO open data Distribution Service and MySQL. In their result, 60% 
failures are caused without leaving log trace. They hope their work will contribute to the 
improvement of logging mechanisms. Cinque et al. [Cinque 12] proposed a rule-based approach 
after their first study, which aims at improving the logs effectiveness of analyze software failures. 
This approach works during the development time and give several criteria for the placement of 
logging statements in source code. They tested this approach and it detect about 12,500 software 
fault injection in real-world systems. 
Chen et al. [Chen 17a] concentrated on the quality of logging and identified logging anti-patterns. 
In their work, they identified six types of misuse of logs, including null-able objects, explicit cast, 
wrong verbosity level, logging code smells and malformed output. In the logging code smells, they 
detected two kind of duplication. They manually examined 352 pairs of independently changed 
logging code snippets from ActiveMQ, Hadoop, and Maven. They provided a tool called 
LCAnalyzer, which helps detect these anti-patterns. 
One of logging anti-pattern from Chen et al. [Chen 17a], duplication, is deeply studied by Li et al. 
[Li 19]. They did the research in 4 open-source system (Hadoop, CloudStack, ElasticSearch and 
Cassandra) and they manually studied more than 3,000 duplicate logging statements. Furthermore, 
they summarized 5 patterns of duplication logging code smells. Then, they verified their results 
by contacting the developers and get their feedback. After research, they provide the tool named 
DLFinder, which could conduct automatically log static analysis in duplication. Next, they tested 
their tool by applying it in another 2 systems, Camel and Wicket. In their results, DLFinder 
reported 82 duplicated code smell instances and in the end, all of them are fixed by the developers. 
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Another tool named “LOGADVISOR” was proposed by Zhu et al. [Zhu 15] by applying Machine 
Learning. The tool is used to guide software developers on to place the new log statements. To 
evaluate the feasible of their tool, LOGADVISOR, they tested it on two systems from Microsoft 
and two open-source projects which are maintained in GitHub. Their results show that they can 
make provide good recommendations to developers on how to write log statement.  
Khanmohammadi et al. [Khanmohammadi 19] conducted research on Android repackaged apps, 
which are considered as one the top 10 risks in mobile security [OWASP 16]. They tested more 
than 15,000 apps from AndroZoo [Li 17b] and studied the motivation of developers and users of 
repacked apps. Also, they detected the factors which determine the apps to be repackaged and the 
ways how these apps are repackaged. Their insights can be of a great help to security experts. In 
addition, a novel app indexing scheme was proposed to minimize the number of comparisons 
needed to detect repackaged apps in app stores. 
2.3.3 Android Vulnerability Analysis 
Software systems are known to have vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers [Murtaza 
16]. In the context of Android apps, there is a large body of research on app vulnerabilities. In this 
thesis, we present some studies related to this thesis.  Cai et al. [Cai 17] created a software toolkit, 
called DroidFax, that is designed to assist developers in program comprehension of Android 
applications. This tool shows the app characterization in multiple dimensions and views. 
Particularly, DroidFax provides all sorts of statistics about an Android app for quality assessment. 
The authors applied the tool to the analysis of 125 apps selected randomly from Google Play and 
concentrate on their dynamic characteristics. Also, they used it on 610 sample apps of malware. 
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Their results provide new insights about Android app behavior. It also helps provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the code structure of Android apps.  
Lu et al. [Lu 12] proposed an approach to automatically detect component hijacking vulnerability 
in Android apps. They used a static analysis framework called CHEX (Component Hijacking 
Examiner), which operates on the system dependency graph, extracted from Android app bytecode. 
The graph is analyzed the detect possible hijack-enabling flow paths. The authors evaluated their 
approach on 5,486 Android apps and found 254 apps with potential component hijacking 
vulnerabilities. In their result, CHEX spent 37.02 seconds on each Android app in average, 
concluding that the approach can scale up to larger datasets. 
Huang et al. [Huang 14b] proposed a novel approach, AsDroid, to check stealthy behaviours in 
Android apps that may be exploited by attackers to insert malware. Their approach concentrates 
on the analysis of top-level functions of an Android app, which are the functions that are executed 
the most when users interact with the app. The authors also used the text from the user interface 
component. They analyzed the top-level functions and the extracted text to check whether they 
match or not. In their work, AsDroid reported that 113 apps have stealthy behaviours, including 
28 false positives and 11 false negatives.  
Arzt et al. [Artz 14] developed a tool, called FlowDroid, which performs static taint analysis of 
Android apps. The tool does not assume the presence of the app source code. Instead, it operates 
on Jimple code. It could provide the location of source and sink in the taint flow path. The authors 
applied this tool to Google Play apps, and succeed to detect vulnerabilities in 500 apps and around 
1,000 malware apps used in the VirusShare project. Similarly, Huang et al. [Huang 14a] conducted 
a study on applying taint analysis to Java-based web applications. They presented SFlow and 
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SFlowIner to make the dataflow and point-to-based taint flow analysis. In addition, their work 
focuses on handling reflection, library and framework.  
Huang et al. [Huang 16] conducted a study to detect sensitive data revelation in Android apps. 
They proposed a novel static analysis technique, called BIDTEXT, that concentrates on the 
variable-related text labels to check the potential disclosure of sensitive. They experimented with 
a dataset of 10,000 Android apps downloaded from the Google Play store. The results show that 
4,406 Android apps incur data disclosure through logging and HTTP requests.  
Rasthofer et al. [Rasthofer 14] proposed SUSI, a novel machine-learning guided approach for 
identifying sources and sinks directly from the code of any Android API. Based on Android apps, 
they categorized the sources and sink using different labels. For the source, it has a unique 
identifier, account, Bluetooth, etc. and for the sink, it has network, files, etc. Their approach was 
evaluated on 11.000 malware samples and in their results achieve 92%.  
Feng et al. [Feng 17] conducted a study on selecting the critical data flows based on the differences 
between benign apps and malware apps. They presented a tool, Scoflow, to automatically detect 
these critical data flows. They used these flows to help distinguish the malware abnormal sensitive 
data usage. In their results, they compared Scoflow and Mudflow. They found their tool has high 
rate of malware detection by 5.73%~9.07% on different dataset. They also argued that their tool 
takes less memory space than Mudflow.  
Rahul et al. [Rahul 13] conducted research on system permission of mobile apps by using the 
analysis of nature language. The authors examined the app’s description and checked whether the 
permissions requested by the app were justified. For example, a typical question is: why does this 
app need this specific permission? They presented a framework based on natural language 
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processing called WHYPER. In the results, the framework achieved an average precision of 82.8%, 
and an average recall of 81.5% for address book, calendar, and record audio permissions. 
Summary 
Logging is an important practice in mobile software development that is used by developers to 
debug and analyze apps. There exist studies that focus on understanding the practice of logging in 
general-stream software development with a focus on the quality of logs as well as where and how 
to log. Logs, however, can be misused yielding security problems. To our knowledge, there are no 
studies that examine the interplay between logging and security and data privacy, which is the 
main objective of this thesis.   
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Chapter 3 - Mobilelike Approach  
 
Overview 
This thesis focuses on studying potential data leakage due to poor logging practices in released 
Android mobile applications. Figure 3.1 shows an overview of our approach, called MobiLogLeak, 
for detecting log statements in Android apps that may potentially leak private data.  Our approach 
consists of five steps. First, we convert the Android APK into an intermediary representation using 
Jimple code [Bartel 12] in order to be able to analyze its content (Section 3.1). We do this because 
we do not assume the presence of the course code. Then, we apply taint analysis to the resulting 
Jimple code to identify the list of taint flow paths (Section 3.2). In our work, we focus only on 
apps with taint flows since these are the potential sources for data leakage. Moreover, since this 
study focuses on data leakage as a result of poor logging practices, we prune paths that are not log-
related. To do that, we use source-sink paths generated through taint flow analysis, and search the 
sinks for possible log related statements (see Section  3.4 .  
The results will be log-specific taint flow paths. After this, to obtain a better understanding of these 
generated log related flows, we perform context analysis to analyze the code structure in order to 
uncover the Android components that have the most log related flows (Section 3.4). Finally, we 
manually inspect each of the taint flow paths to understand the type of the possible data leakage 







Figure 3.1 Overview of Our Approach 
Converting App APK to Jimple code 
Since we are interested in analyzing log statements in deployed apps, we cannot assume the 
presence of the source code. We therefore need to reverse engineer the app APK to an intermediate 
representation that we can analyze. To this end, we turn to the Soot framework [Bartel 12], which 
is used for analyzing and transforming Java and Android apps to Jimple, a code format between 
source code and Byte code that is commonly used in program analysis. 
Although it is longer than the normal source code, Jimple code maintains the required program 
constructs needed for program analysis, such as the function names, classes and code statements. 
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Hence, it can be used to identify the logging statements in an Android app. Figure 3.2 shows an 
example of a Jimple code snippet of a logging statement that is generated from an APK using Soot.  
 
Figure 3.2 Source code and its corresponding Jimple code 
The Java code contains one static function, which returns an integer. Inside the function, there is 
one while-loop to modify the variable resulting from multiplying it by 1 to x. Compared to Java 
code, Jimple code also shows the function type, return value and parament. Rather than showing 
the while-loop, Jimple uses “goto” to control the data flow in the process. The data is from label 
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0 to label 1 and then comes from the label 1 to label 0. Jimple code uses another way to achieve 
the while-loop. 
Taint Flow Analysis 
The main aspect of our approach is to identify sources of data leaks that are related to log 
statements. One way to identify data leaks is through taint flow analysis [Klieber 14]. The goal of 
taint flow analysis is to check whether sensitive data remains within an expected application's 
boundaries [Klieber 14]. Taint analysis can be applied statically or dynamically.  
In this thesis, we apply static taint flow analysis on the generated Jimple code from the previous 
step. We achieve this using FlowDroid [Arzt 14], which is a static analysis tool built on Soot that 
allows us to retrieve the data flow between sources and sinks, hence uncovering all the paths that 
are related to data leaks. 
 
Figure 3.3 Taint flow analysis example 
Arzt et al. [Arzt 14] proposed a tool, called FlowDroid, to help find the taint flows in Android 
apps. The tool is based on the Soot framework and operates on Jimple code. FlowDroid takes the 
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apk file as input and builds a control flow graph, which shows the source and sink of taint flows. 
Taint flow analysis can be described using the example of Figure 3.3. In Label 1, the variable w 
gets the value from source(). Then, the source is transformed from x.f to a.g.f (Label 2 to Label 5). 
Next, the variable b gets the variable a.g and in the end, the sink gets the b.f in Label 7, which is 
the source in Label 1. 
Generating the Source-Sink Log-Related Paths 
The paths that are generated in Step 2 include all sources of data leaks (shown in Figure 3.4). In 
this step, we refine the list of paths, by focusing only on paths that are related to log statements. In 
other words, the goal is to retrieve only paths whose sinks contain a logging related statement. 
In previous studies (e.g., [Chen 17a]), researchers filter the log statements using regular 
expressions and keywords such as the ones shown in Figure 3.5. In other words, they look at 
statements that contain the word “Log”. The problem is that this approach contains many false 
positives such as expressions that contains words like “dialog” and “login”, which are not log 
statements.  
In Jimple, shown in Listing 1, log statements are accompanied with their library classes (e.g., 
android.util.Log), making it easy to filter the generated taint flow analysis paths by keeping only 
those that contain log statements as their sink. A simple string match search looking for the log 
related libraries in the sink for the taint flow paths suffices. The result of this step are all the taint 
flow paths that are related to log statements. In the rest of this thesis, we refer to these paths as 




Figure 3.4 Example of a taint flow graph 
 
Figure 3.5 Log Filter in Previous Research  
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Context Analysis of Log-Related Paths 
In this step, we measure different aspects related to 'bad' log statements (logs that appear on the 
taint flow analysis paths). These aspects include the component, the class, the block of this log 
statement. In the component level, we check these logs are in Activity, Service, Broadcast Receiver 
or Content Provider. In the class level, we print their java class names. In block level, we verify 
whether they are in exception block or not. If yes, we go deep and find they are in the part of catch 
or final.  
For this, we use DroidFax [Cai 17], a software toolkit that is designed to assist developers in 
program comprehension of Android applications. Particularly, DroidFax provides all sorts of 
statistics about an Android app for quality assessment. Similar to FlowDroid [Arzt 14], it also 
analyzes the application using Jimple code. We used FlowFax to check the log density, identify 
the components that are logged the most, identify parts of the code that contain logs such as 
exceptions and reflective functions. For example, in Listing 3, there is one log statement in Line 
14. From this code snippet, we could generate  Figure 3.6 for its details.  
1.     Class c.a.a.b.a   
2.     public void onPreviewFrame(byte[], android.hardware.Camera)   
3.     {   
4.         ... 
5.         java.lang.String $r17;   
6.         java.lang.NullPointerException $r18;   
7.         java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException $r19;   
8.         java.lang.Throwable $r20, $r21;   
9.         ... 
10.      label29:   
11.         $r16 := @caughtexception;   
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12.         $r17 = virtualinvoke $r16.<java.lang.RuntimeException: java.lang.String toString()>();   
13.         $r20 = (java.lang.Throwable) $r16;   
14.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int e(java.lang.String,java.lang.String,java.lang.Throwable)>("ZXingScanner
View", $r17, $r20);   
15.         return;   
16.         ... 
17.     } 
Listing 3: Log Snippet Example 
As shown in Figure 3.6, we can directly find the context of log statement, including its method 
name (onPreviewFrame) and class name (c.a.a.b.a). Furthermore, when we check the app 
downloaded information, we can retrieve the app  hash key (which is 00CFCA10 in our case) and 





Figure 3.6 Overview of Context Process 
In addition, we can further use Soot to find more information such as the Activity component, the 
code blocks, etc. (shown in green in Figure 3.6).  
DroidFax provides the API to obtain the component type. The name is getComponentType and it 
is shown in the Listing 4. It requires the soot class and return the type. 
1. public static String getComponentType(SootClass cls) {   
2.     try {   
3.         if (fhar==null) {   
4.             fhar = Scene.v().getOrMakeFastHierarchy();   
5.         }   
6.         if (fhar.isSubclass(cls, iccAPICom.COMPONENT_TYPE_ACTIVITY))   
7.             return "Activity";   
8.         if (fhar.isSubclass(cls, iccAPICom.COMPONENT_TYPE_SERVICE) ||   
26 
 
9.             fhar.isSubclass(cls, iccAPICom.COMPONENT_TYPE_GCMBASEINTENTSER  VICECLASS) || 
fhar.isSubclass(cls, iccAPICom.COMPONENT_TYPE_GCMLISTENERSERVICECLASS))   
10.             return "Service";   
11.         if (fhar.isSubclass(cls, iccAPICom.COMPONENT_TYPE_RECEIVER))   
12.             return "BroadcastReceiver";   
13.         if (fhar.isSubclass(cls, iccAPICom.COMPONENT_TYPE_PROVIDER))   
14.             return "ContentProvider";   
15.         if (fhar.isSubclass(cls, iccAPICom.COMPONENT_TYPE_APPLICATION))   
16.             return "Application";   
17.         return "Unknown";   
18.     }   
19.     catch (Exception e) {   
20.         e.printStackTrace();   
21.         return "Unknown";   
22.     }   
23. }  
Listing 4: Get Component Type 
When we use this function, we get the class before checking the log statement. It means we look 
at the class at first and get the type. Then, all the log statements will be marked by this label. 
Different from it, exception block detection is done at the level of blocks. It uses another object 




Figure 3.7 App Detail in Google Play 
In addition, we can cross reference the Hash Key and package name with information from 
Android app stores (such as Google Play) such as the app name (Kiosk Browser Lockdown), the 
number of downloads (more than 1,000)  and the app category (Business) (Shown in Figure 3.7). 
We compare the number of log statements in ALRS and those where no taint flow paths were 
discovered. First, we compare the logging density between applications with taint flows (ALRS) 
and those without. Second, we compare the context, in which the log statements appear, in other 
words, the distribution of log statements in the different Android components: Activities, Services, 
Content Providers, and Broadcast Receivers (shown in Figure 3.8). 
For each app, we first identify the component that has the largest number of logs. Then, we 
calculate how many apps with this component that have most logs in our dataset (AWLC).  
To do it, we use the equation as below: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝐴𝑊𝐿𝐶
Total Apps in This Year
 
To compare the component percentage of Good apps and ALRS., we separately computing it and 
list the result in Table 4-3. 
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where LLOC refers to the total number of log statements of Jimple code and SLOC refers to the 
total number of code source lines of Jimple Code. 
 
Figure 3.8 Context Statistics Level 
 
Meanwhile, we calculate the percentage of exception block and reflective method. Exception is 
used often during Android development, and it often uses log to show the errors. To clarify how 





Inside, the LLE is Line of Log statements in Exception block. Same to it, we calculated the 







LLR is Line of Log statements in Reflective method. 
Types of Log-Related Data Leakage 
 
Figure 3.9 Source Categorization 
The aim of this step is to categorize logging related data leakage cases. To this end, we manually 
inspect each of the taint flow paths generated in Step 3 and categorize them into four identified 
data leak types, which are database related, network related, location related, and account related. 
As shown in Figure 3.9, we start from the source of taint flow path. In each source, the type is 
different. From DroidFax, we could categorize it bash on its features by CatSource. CatSource is 
one file which list all possible data source in taint flow analysis. We list four categories in Listing 




1. LOCATION_INFORMATION:   
2. <android.location.Country: java.lang.String getCountryIso()> (LOCATION_INFORMATION)   
3. <com.android.server.location.PassiveProvider: long getStatusUpdateTime()> (LOCATION_INFORMATI
ON)   
4. <android.telephony.TelephonyManager: java.lang.String getNetworkTypeName()> (LOCATION_INFORM
ATION)   
5. <android.location.Address: int getMaxAddressLineIndex()> (LOCATION_INFORMATION)   
6. <android.location.LocationRequest: long getInterval()> (LOCATION_INFORMATION)   
7. NETWORK_INFORMATION:   
8. <com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService$ServiceIntentResolver: java.util.List queryIntentForPa
ckage(android.content.Intent,java.lang.String,int,java.util.ArrayList,int)> (NETWORK_INFORMATION)   
9. <android.net.wifi.p2p.WifiP2pWfdInfo: int getControlPort()> (NETWORK_INFORMATION)   
10. <com.android.server.AppWidgetServiceImpl: java.util.List getInstalledProviders()> (NETWORK_INFOR
MATION)   
11. <android.support.v4.view.ViewPager$2: float getInterpolation(float)> (NETWORK_INFORMATION)   
12. <com.android.internal.telephony.IccIoResult: java.lang.String toString()> (NETWORK_INFORMATION)   
13.    
14. ACCOUNT_INFORMATION:   
15. <android.accounts.AccountManagerService$Session: android.accounts.IAccountManagerResponse get
ResponseAndClose()> (ACCOUNT_INFORMATION)   
16. <android.accounts.AccountManager: android.accounts.AccountManagerFuture confirmCredentials(andro
id.accounts.Account,android.os.Bundle,android.app.Activity,android.accounts.AccountManagerCallback,and
roid.os.Handler)> (ACCOUNT_INFORMATION)   
17. <android.accounts.AccountManagerService: android.accounts.Account[] getAccountsAsUser(java.lang.S
tring,int)> (ACCOUNT_INFORMATION)   
18. <android.test.IsolatedContext$MockAccountManager: android.accounts.AccountManagerFuture getAcco
untsByTypeAndFeatures(java.lang.String,java.lang.String[],android.accounts.AccountManagerCallback,andr
oid.os.Handler)> (ACCOUNT_INFORMATION)   
19. <android.accounts.IAccountManager$Stub$Proxy: java.lang.String getUserData(android.accounts.Accou
nt,java.lang.String)> (ACCOUNT_INFORMATION)   
20.    
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21. SMS_MMS:   
22. <com.google.android.mms.pdu.DeliveryInd: byte[] getMessageId()> android.permission.STOP_APP_SW
ITCHES (SMS_MMS)   
23. <com.google.android.mms.pdu.AcknowledgeInd: byte[] getTransactionId()> (SMS_MMS)   
24. <com.google.android.mms.pdu.NotifyRespInd: byte[] getTransactionId()> (SMS_MMS)   
25. <com.google.android.mms.ContentType: java.util.ArrayList getVideoTypes()> (SMS_MMS)   
26. <com.google.android.mms.pdu.PduBody: com.google.android.mms.pdu.PduPart getPartByContentId(jav
a.lang.String)> (SMS_MMS)   
Listing 5: CatSource: Examples of Different Categories 
For example, if we find the source is from the Android default function, getPartByContentId, we 
will find the function in the CatSource file. Then, we could see the function in Line 27 of  Listing 
5. Therefore, we mark this source as SMS_MMS. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we presented our approach for detecting log statements that potentially leak 
sensitive data using taint flow analysis that is generated by FlowDroid. 
Our method uses static analysis of Jimple code generated from app APKs. The taint flow analysis 
automatically narrows the range of apps which are potential to leak data from apps. In addition, 
we study the context of the sinks and sources to understand where risky logs appear in the app. 
For each log statement, we search the function that contains the statement and retrieve the 
corresponding app component, class, function and code block. The manual analysis goes one step 




Chapter 4 - Evaluation 
Dataset Description 
We applied MobiLogLeak to a dataset of a randomly collected sample of 5,000 Android 
applications from AndroZoo [Li 17b] (2,500 apps were published in year 2017 and the other 2,500 
are from 2018). We converted their APKs to Jimple code and used Flowdroid to apply taint flow 
analysis. As shown in Figure 4.1, we found taint flow paths in 276 apps. We pruned paths that are 
not log-related by searching the sink paths for log related statements. This resulted in 200 
applications (shown in Table A1 of Appendix A) with taint flow paths that have log-related sinks.  
 
 




The resulting 200 apps include apps from various app categories including music, finance, 
education, fitness, etc. (as shown in Table 4-1). We found that about half of the dataset of apps 
with log-related taint paths (102 apps) belong to the Personalization category. These apps collect 
user profile information including all sort of people’s personal data. They manipulate more private 
information than apps in other categories. For example, the app Pink Love Heart Keyboard Theme, 
a Personalization app, uses logs to display network information through the Broadcast component. 
We found that when this app receives data from other apps, this data is output through logging 
statement. The complete list of log-related statements of the analyzed apps is shown in Table A1 
of Appendix A.  
Table 4-1 Categorization of apps in the dataset with log-related sinks  
Category Number Category Number 
Personalization 102 (51%) Music & Video 4 (2%) 
Entertainment 13 (7.5%) Finance 4 (2%) 
Business 8 (4%) News & Magazines 4 (2%) 
Tools 8 (4%) Casino 2 (1%) 
Communication 7 (3.5%) Travel & Local 2 (1%) 




Apps in other categories are also affected. For example, most entertainment apps require from 
users to register with third-party social media accounts (i.e., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram), which 
may lead to leakage of social media related information. The same applies to Business apps, which 
manipulate information related to organizations.  
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of ALRS based on the number of installations   
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of ALRS based on the number of installations. We can see that 
many of these applications are highly popular. In particular, three of these apps were installed 
more than 100 million times, meaning that even though these apps count for only 1.5% of the total 
ALRS, the number of impacted users can be considerably high.    
In addition, about half of ALRS are installed less than 10 thousand times, suggesting that for these 
less popular apps, developers do not pay the needed attention to logging issues. It appears that for 
these apps, developers use logging for monitoring purposes, ignoring the potential threats that poor 












100 Million + 100 Thousand to 100 Million 10 Thousnad to 100 Thousand 10 Thousand -
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Context Analysis Results 
Table 4-2 shows that good apps have higher log density than ALRS. At first glace, this looks as a 
surprising result. To further explore this, we separated the data into two datasets based on the year 
of publication of the apps, i.e., 2017 and 2018, and recalculate the log density. The number of apps 
in each year is 2,500. The results were consistent with our previous finding. One possible 
explanation for this is that apps that are heavily logged are those written by experienced developers, 
who also seem to apply good logging practices, such as removing log statements that could reveal 
sensitive data before releasing the apps, but also use more logs for exception handling and for 
explaining errors.  
Table 4-2 Log context analysis 




Good Apps 436,167,099 1,205,557 1/362 323,295 (26.82%) 72,867 (6.04%) 




246,732,779 690,173 1/357 175,361 (25.41%) 41,994 (6.08%) 
2,500 apps 
in 2018 
224,120,416 579,680 1/387 163,882 (28,27%) 33,145 (5.71%) 
 





Table 4-3 shows the distributions of logging statements through Android app components. The 
results show that most logging occur in the Activity components, with almost no logging in the 
Content provider component (zero in our case).  We can see that the Activity component accounts 
for 98.5% of all the logs in ALRS, suggesting that any further study for detecting logging 
statements that may leak data should focus on the Activity component. The reason is that all the 
interactions with users take place in Activity component such collecting the input stream, sending 
text to background, and showing the results.  
Table 4-3 Components for each app in different types 
Component 4,800 Good Apps  200 ALRS  Total 5000 Apps 
Activity 4620 (96.25%) 197 (98.5%) 4817 (96.34%) 
Service 15 (0.3125%) 0 15 (0.3%) 
Broadcast Receiver 6 (0.125%) 1 (0.5%) 7 (0.14%) 
Content Provider 0 0 0 
Application 0 0 0 
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Unknown 159 (3.3125%) 2 (1%) 161 (3.22%) 
 
As part of this analysis, we also studied if log-related sinks appear in reflective methods and 
exception blocks as those two constructs normally contain log statements. We found that 25% of 
the total log statements are in the exception blocks and 5% in the reflection methods. No poor 
logging (i.e., sink related log statements) was reported in those two constructs. 
Taint Flow Analysis Results  
In this section, we show by example, how we manually inspect each of the taint flow paths 
generated in Chapter 3.6 in order to categorize the log-related leakage cases based on the types of 
leakage. 
Recall that each taint flow path consists of a sink and a source. In our manual analysis, we start 
from the source and then we find the corresponding API that is related to that source. Using the 
description of the API, we can identify the actual data leaked in the corresponding taint flow path. 
01. public static java.lang.String i(android.content.Context)   
02.     { ...    
03.         label05:   
04.            $r3 = virtualinvoke $r2.<android.telephony.TelephonyManager: java.lang.String getDeviceId()>();   
05.         label06:     
06.            $r4 = $r3;     
07.            $r5 = new java.lang.StringBuilder;     
08.     label07:     
09.            specialinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>();     
10.     $r5 = virtualinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>($r3);     
11.      $r5 = virtualinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>("device ID");     
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12.      $r6 = virtualinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String toString()>();     
13.      staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("deviceIMEI", $r6);   
14.       ...    
15.    }  
Listing 6: Code Snippet for Case Network Device ID 
For example, in Listing 6 (the complete code is in Listing B1), the method getDeviceId() in Line 
4 is a source that is related to the log-related sink that leaks the device IMEI in Line 13. To obtain 
the API that corresponds to the source, we can look up the method "getDeviceId" in the list of 
APIs provided by the Android software development kit (SDK). 
 
Figure 4.3 Android API – Network: getDeviceId 
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Figure 4.3 shows the description of the API and the actual data retrieved by calling getDeviceID, 
which will be then leaked through the log statement at the sink. In this case, it is the IMEI for 
GSM. Based on the API description, we can categorize the leakage into one of the following four 
categories.  
 Network, including Mac address, Device Id Sim Serial Number, country and package 
manager. 
 Account, including name, token, password and type of the account owner. 
 Location, including latitude, longitude, and last-known location. 
 Database, including ID, password, subdomain, website link name, etc. 
For the previous example, this data leakage is related to Network. 
01. public static java.lang.String f(android.content.Context)   
02.     {   
03.         ...   
04.         $r4 = $r5.<android.accounts.Account: java.lang.String name>;   
05.         $r6 = $r5.<android.accounts.Account: java.lang.String type>;   
06.         ...   
07.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>("Emails: "; 
08.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>($r4);   
09.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String toString()>();   
10.     staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int e(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("PIKLOG", $r6); 
11.         ...   
12.     }   
Listing 7: Code Snippet for Case Account Name 
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Account is another default object of Android. It represents an Account in the AccountManager. 
This object is parcelable and also overrides equals(Object) and hashCode(), making it suitable for 
use as the key of a Map. There is one example shown in the following Listing 7 (the complete 
code is in Listing B2). As shown in Line 04, $r4 gets the account list and takes the value, name of 
account. From Android API shown in Figure 4.4, we check the class “android.accounts.Account”.  
 
Figure 4.4 Android API - Account 
Then, in Line 08 of Listing 7, it appends this data into the String $r3 and in line 10, this statement 
uses error function of logging to show it. According to the static text in Line 07, the name is the 
“Emails”. Then, we can confirm the apps store the “email” as name and this code releases the 
email here.   
Location is a data class representing a geographic location. A location can consist of a latitude, 
longitude, timestamp, and other information such as bearing, altitude and velocity. All locations 
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generated by the LocationManager are guaranteed to have a valid latitude, longitude, and 
timestamp (both UTC time and elapsed real-time since boot), all other parameters are optional. 
1. public android.location.Location a()     
2.     {     
3.      ...       
4.      label12:   
5.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: android.location.Location d> = $r5;   
6.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: android.location.Location d>;   
7.         if $r5 == null goto label18;   
8.      label13:   
9.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: android.location.Location d>;   
10.         $d0 = virtualinvoke $r5.<android.location.Location: double getLatitude()>();   
11.      label14:   
12.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double e> = $d0;   
13.      label15:   
14.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: android.location.Location d>;   
15.         $d0 = virtualinvoke $r5.<android.location.Location: double getLongitude()>();   
16.      label16:   
17.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double f> = $d0;   
18.      label17:   
19.         $r6 = new java.lang.StringBuilder;   
20.         specialinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>();   
21.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>("latit
ude [");   
22.         $d0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double e>;   
23.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(double)>($d0);   
24.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>(" ]");  
25.         $r7 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String toString()>();   
26.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("Lac", $r7); 
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27.         $r6 = new java.lang.StringBuilder;   
28.         specialinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>();   
29.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>("lon
gitude [");   
30.         $d0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double f>;   
31.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(double)>($d0);   
32.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder append(java.lang.String)>(" ]"); 
  
33.         $r7 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String toString()>();   
34.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("Lac", $r7); 
35.      ...     
36. } 
Listing 8: Code Snippet for Case Location latitude and longitude 
We have one example shown in the Listing 8 (the complete code is in Listing B3). Similar to the 
other categories, in Line 15, it gets the longitude data and assigns it to $d0. Then, it appends this 
data to String $r6 in Line 31, and converts it into String $r7 in Line 33. Finally, the program uses 
debug function of logging to show it in Line 34. 
 




Figure 4.6 Android API – Location getLongitude 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 indicate the Android API for “getLatitude” and “getLongtitude”. These 
two functions work for the “LocationManager”.  
When we install an Android app, the system asks the user for permission to access location data. 
For personal security or other reasons, we can deny the app from getting this permission. However, 
even if we forbid an app to access the location, the apps could access the log file of other apps to 
get our location information, which circumvents Android permission mechanism.  
The process described so far can help in retrieving the corresponding API of a source (hence the 
actual data) where the leakage is related to network, account, or location type. Unfortunately, this 
process may not work in complex situations, such as in the case of the database leakage type. In 
such scenarios, the path from the source to the sink is normally long and can take several 
alternatives. Moreover, the automatically identified source (by Flowdroid) does not provide us 





01. private boolean a(java.lang.String)   
02.     {   
03.         ...   
04.         $r3 = specialinvoke $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingServic
e: java.lang.String a()>();   
05.         ...   
06.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int i(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("MyFirebaseMsgService", $r3);   
07.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int i(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("MyFirebaseMsgService", "oldpassw
ord and newpassword matches. save new password");   
08.         ...   
09.     }   
10. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
11. private java.lang.String a()   
12.     {   
13.         ...   
14.         $r1 = virtualinvoke $r2.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b: java.lang.String e()>();   
15.         return $r1;   
16.     }   
17. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
18. public java.lang.String e()   
19.     {   
20.     ...   
21.         $i0 = interfaceinvoke $r3.<android.database.Cursor: int getColumnIndex(java.lang.String)>("password");   
22.         $r4 = interfaceinvoke $r3.<android.database.Cursor: java.lang.String getString(int)>($i0);   
23.         return $r4;   
24.         ...   
25.     }   
Listing 9: Code Snippet for Case Database Password 
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Hence, the analysis normally includes tracking the real source. For example, in Listing 9 (the 
complete code is in Listing B4), starting from the source in Line 22, Flowdroid pointed to a source 
for a database leakage. In order to identify the actual leaked data, a thorough analysis is required 
starting from the log statement at the sink to the actual source. Once we identify the real source, 
based on the parameters, we can find which query the source used and what are the fields in that 
query (shown in Figure 4.7) 
 
Figure 4.7 ALRS Apps Source Categories 
For example, in Listing 9, to track the data and confirm the real path, we start from the sink in 
Line 06 in Listing 9. It is the log statement that contains the variable $r3. We go back and look for 
the value of $r3 and in Line 04, we find it is from the function, private Boolean a(java.lang.String). 
Then, we go to this function and check it. We know the final return value is $r1 in Line 15. It 
comes from the function 'public java.lang.String e()' in Line 14. Then we trace this function shown 
in Line 18. In the function, public java.lang.String e(), we could find the final return value is $r4. 
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Based on FlowDroid, the source is in Line 22. From Figure 4.8, we can relate this statement to the 
function “getString”,  which returns the value of that column. 
 
Figure 4.8 Android API - Database getString 
However, if we stop here, we can only know the data from the database. We need to go further to 
identify the real source and the value from the database that is leaked. This information cannot be 
inferred from getString(int)($i0). To solve this, we read this function and check it again. Luckily, 
we find the $r4 is from the query operation, getColumnIndex(java.lang.String)>("password") in 
Line 21. As shown in Figure 4.9, the function, getColumnIndex returns the index of the given 
variable. In the code, the given variable is password, so this statement returns the index of 




Figure 4.9 Android API - Database getColumnIndex 
In this case, the source is transformed into two other functions, and we can check the static text of 
logging in Line 07. It is “oldpassword and newpassword matches. save new password”. It means 
this logging happens during the change of passwords. As we mentioned before, most taint flows 
are likely caused by developers who use log for debugging during development but forget to delete 
this type of log statement before deployment. 
We applied this manual analysis to the 200 apps with log-related sinks (i.e., ALRS). In total, there 
were 380 sources with elements of sensitive data, and 293 sinks with log statements related to the 
data elements in the source. Out of the 380 sources, 186 (49%) leaked network sensitive data, 170 
(45%) leaked database sensitive data, 22 (5%) leaked location sensitive data and 2 (0.5%) sources 
leaked user account data. 
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These results, although preliminary, clearly demonstrate that logging, when not used carefully, 
may lead to the leakage of sensitive information. There is a need to raise awareness around this 
topic and start developing logging guidelines to prevent these situations. We suspect that the cases 
we found are caused by developers who may have needed these logs during development, but 
omitted to remove them before releasing the apps. We need to dig further to understand (1) the 
scale of this problem, and (2) the causes. 
Threats to validity  
Internal Validity:  We manually analyzed all the taint flow analysis paths that contain log 
statements as sinks. Three authors checked the results. Because this is done manually, errors may 
have occurred, which we recognize as a threat to internal validity. Another threat is related to the 
selection of the 5,000 apps. We selected these apps randomly, but a different set may lead to 
different results.   
External Validity: Software engineering studies suffer from the variability of the real world, and 
the generalization problem cannot be solved completely. Although we have used 5,000 apps in 
this study (to reduce the risk of insufficient generalization), our evaluation remains preliminary 
and should be qualified as an early research, and may not be generalizable to other apps. 
Limitations 
In our dataset, some of them cannot be analyzed by soot, the exceptions of building graph failed. 
This is attributed to the limitations of static analysis. Flowdroid is known to be unable to analyze 
some apps due to various reasons (e.g., corrupted DEX code, missing app assets, obfuscated code, 
use of special features that are not accounted for by the analysis, etc.) 
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 Flowdroid and droidfax are based on Soot. During the experiment, we have three kinds of apps. 
The first group works well with Soot. They are built the process graph and return the amount for 
the method categories. Second group just throws the exception like java.lang.AssertionError but 
it also gives me the result. For this group, we ignore the exception. Obviously, the exception 
appears after the result comes out. For the third group, it just gives me one exception like 
NonePointException. This group will influence our accuracy, so when we calculate the percentage, 
we will ignore this group.  
Also, for the taint flows, some apps use query instead of getcolumn to show the data. For these 
applications, we cannot know what kind of information is leaked. For example,  
$r9 = interfaceinvoke $r15.<android.database.Cursor: java.lang.String getString(int)>(1)   
It checks the index of the column so we cannot know the column name. It depends on the structure 




Chapter 5 - Conclusion and Future Work 
Research Contributions 
In this study, we investigated the impact of logging practices on data leakage. Particularly, we 
explored how common are poor logging practices in mobile applications and the effect of not 
removing logs related to sensitive information before releasing the application. Our preliminary 
results show that log statements are common in the released mobile applications. There is one log 
statement in each 362 lines of code. Not all these logs are a result of bad logging practices. For 
example, in our study on 5,000 mobile applications, none of the log statements in the exception 
blocks leaked sensitive data. On the other hand, poor logging practices are also common in mobile 
applications. Out of 276 apps with taint flows, 200or around 72% leaked sensitive data due to poor 
logging practices. We categorized the data leakages that are related to logging practices into four 
types. The results demonstrate that in the 200 apps that we manually analyzed, there were 
380sources of data leakage, 186 of these sources leaked network sensitive data, 170 leaked 
database sensitive data, 22 leaked location sensitive data and 2 sources leaked user account data.  
Opportunities for Further Research 
Our preliminary results suggest a correlation between the context of logging practices and whether 
these practices are good or poor, further investigation is required as part of future work. Another 
interesting future direction is to automatically classify the leaked data in the categories network, 
account, location, and database.  
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For the callback functions, we need to improve our method for analyzing them because they are 
always used when systems want to manage the app lifecycle. Also, we should continue examining 
log statements that appear in exception blocks, used by developers to uncover the root causes of 
defects, to prevent situations where logged variables may adversely leak sensitive data.  
Moreover, we should continue experimenting with more apps, including commercial apps, from 
various categories to understand the scope of this problem and to design techniques for preventing 
it. Priority should be given to popular apps since they can affect a large number of users. 
In addition, we should develop automated techniques to detect potential data leaks in existing log 
data. However, the large size of typical log data may render this task very difficult. Tools for 
achieving this should be equipped with some sort of log abstraction techniques (such as the ones 
surveyed by El-Masri et al. [El-Masri 2020]) in order to reduce the large size of log data while 
keeping the main information. There exist also several abstraction techniques used in tracing such 
as the ones proposed by Hamou-Lhadj et al. [Hamou-Lhadj 2002, Hamou-Lhadj 2006] that can be 
readily applied to the abstraction of large streams of log data.  
Finally, we should study whether the use of logging can be reduced by resorting to other dynamic 
analysis techniques such as tracing of program flows and program profiling. These approaches do 






Appendix A. Results of the experiments 
Table A1. 200 Taint Apps Dataset 
Name Installations Label 
CM Launcher 3D - Themes, Wallpapers 100,000,000 Personalization 
Power Clean - Antivirus & Phone Cleaner App 100,000,000 Tools 
Bit Clean 100,000,000 Tools 
CM Browser - Ad Blocker, Fast Download, Privacy 
5.22.21.0051  50,000,000 Communication 
Opera News 50,000,000 News & Magazines 
Emoji Keyboard - Cute Emoji, GIF, Sticker, Emoticon 50,000,000 Tools 
Starbucks 10,000,000 Food & Drink 
Moto File Manager 10,000,000 Tools 
ESPNCricinfo - Live Cricket Scores, News & Videos 10,000,000 Sports 
Cool Black Theme 10,000,000 Entertainment 
Taichi Panda 10,000,000 Role Playing 
Opera Mini browser beta 10,000,000 Communication 
Gradeup: Exam Preparation App | Free Mocks | Class 5,000,000 Education 
DdcatApp 1,450,000 Entertainment 
Anime Wallpaper Master 1,000,000 Personalization 
Say caller name 1,000,000 Tools 
SignEasy | Sign and Fill PDF and other Documents 1,000,000 Business 
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Pink Glitter Bow Keyboard Theme 1,000,000 Personalization 
Rummy 45 - Remi Etalat 1,000,000 Card 
Alive In Shelter 1,000,000 Strategy 
Facemoji Keyboard Lite: GIF, Emoji, DIY Theme 1,000,000 Personalization 
Pixel Doodle: Color by Number, Pixel Art, Color Game 1,000,000 
Video Editor & 
Video Maker Dev 
God christ keyboard 1,000,000 Personalization 
Lucky Slots - Free Casino Game 1,000,000 Casino 
Messaging+ SMS, MMS Free 1,000,000 Communication 
Color shiny rose theme keyboard 1,000,000 Personalization 
Pink Love Heart Keyboard Theme 1,000,000 Personalization 
Messaging+ SMS, MMS Free 1,000,000 Communication 
Summer GO Keyboard Theme 1,000,000 Personalization 
Fairy live wallpaper 500,000 Personalization 
Silk Gold Icons Theme 500,000 Personalization 
Black Cool Wolf King Theme 500,000 Personalization 
ForteBank 500,000 Finance 
 Entertainment 500,000 قصص الصغار
Golden Fidget Spinner Theme 500,000 Personalization 
Equalizer Pro - Extra Sound 500,000 Music & Audio 
Indian Girls Photo Maker 500,000 Photography 
Arab Man Fashion Photo Suit 500,000 Photography 
54 
 
Custom Wallpaper Maker FREE 100,000 Tools 
Graffiti Skull Smoke keyboard 100,000 Personalization 
Cute Cartoon Owl Bowknot Theme  100,000 Personalization 
Neon Butterfly Live Wallpaper 100,000 Personalisation 
Gold Luxury Car Theme 100,000 Personalization 
Cute Girl Theme 100,000 Lifestyle 
Sketched Street View 100,000 Personalization 
Theme for Galaxy S9 Plus 100,000 Personalization 
Crimson Horrific White Eyes Theme 100,000 Personalization 
Gun Man Photo Montage 100,000 Entertainment 
The Purple Fantasy Wonderland Theme 100,000 Personalization 
Calisteniapp - Calisthenics & Street Workout 100,000 Health & Fitness 
Krishna Flute Ringtones 100,000 Music & Audio 
Pink Minny Diamond keyboard 100,000 Personalization 
BankSA Mobile Banking 100,000 Finance 
Black Gold Business Theme 100,000 Personalization 
Hijau Gothic Logam Coretan Tengkorak Tema 100,000 Personalization 
Tavla 100,000 Board 
Pink Rose Black Lace Theme 100,000 Personalization 
Heathrow Express 100,000 Travel & Local 
Shiny Neon Love Launcher 100,000 Personalization 
Citations de La Vie 100,000 Entertainment 
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Dhoka Shayari 100,000 Social 
Glass Water Drop Keyboard 100,000 Personalisation 
Panda Sakura Theme 100,000 Personalization 
Goal Achiever's Multitool - Goalist 100,000 Productivity 
Motobike Sport Thème 100,000 Personalisation 
Dard Shayari 100,000 Entertainment 
Subway Bus Racer 50,000 Racing 
Pink Love Butterfly Keyboard 50,000 Personalization 
Crystal Rose Love 3D Theme 50,000 Personalization 
com.hld.anzenbokusu 50,000 Tools 
Tattoo Rose Romantic Wolf Theme 50,000 Personalization 
Space Planet 3D Earth Theme 50,000 Lifestyle 
Romantic Red Love Heart Theme 50,000 Personalization 
cute skull icon pink bow theme 50,000 Personalization 
Typewriter Keyboard 50,000 Personalization 
Blue Flames Keyboard Theme 50,000 Personalization 
Purple Luxury Golden Butterfly Theme 50,000 Personalization 
Pink Cute Flower Rose Red Petals Keyboard Theme 50,000 Personalisation 
3D Green Maple Leaf 50,000 Personalization 
悟空问答 20,000 Communication 
HTC Yellow Pages 10,000 Business 
Lavender water drop keyboard theme 10,000 Personalization 
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Neon Koi Fish Space 3D Theme 10,000 Personalization 
Thermal Camera Filter Effect Flashlight 10,000 Entertainment 
 Blackboard Graffiti Theme 10,000 Personalization 
Water Fire Fist Battle Keyboard Theme 10,000 Personalization 
Movilizer 10,000 Business 
Spoint 10,000 Lifestyle 
Butterfly Fairy Nature Theme 10,000 Personalization 
Girly Paris keyboard theme 10,000 Personalization 
Glitter Blue Dream Theme - glitter wallpaper 10,000 Personalization 
Weed Ghost Gun Launcher Theme 10,000 Personalization 
Tumbi 10,000 Music & Audio 
Blue Glitter Cute Panda Keyboard 10,000 Personalization 
Animated Cute Pink Hearts Keyboard 10,000 Beauty 
Турецкий для влюблённых (DEMO) 10,000 Travel & Local 
Orange Cartoon Cute Lazy Cat Theme 10,000 Personalization 
Pink Black Kitty Love Theme 10,000 Lifestyle 
Black Business Gold Theme 10,000 Personalization 
Judai Shayari 10,000 Social 
SuperSMS - Text Messages 10,000 Communication 
Fire Lion Theme 10,000 Personalisation 
Cute Anime Girl 3D 10,000 Personalisation 
Cute Dog Love Theme 5,000 Lifestyle 
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Citations de Nicolas Michiavel 5,000 Education 
Bubble Spinner Deluxe 5,000 Casual 
Cute Snow Penguin Baby Theme 5,000 Personalization 
Black Skull Keyboard Theme 5,000 Personalization 
Cute Panda Girl Theme 5,000 Personalization 
Consumer Protection Act 5,000 Books & Reference 
Cute Unicorn Whale 5,000 Personalization 
Bullet Gun Theme 5,000 Personalization 
Cool Speedy Racing car keyboard 5,000 Personalization 
My BVF 1,000 House & Home 
Electronic Music DJ Mellow Theme 1,000 Entertainment 
Diamond pink leopard theme 1,000 Personalisation 
GGM VIEW 1,000 Business 
Christmas Gift Tree Gravity Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Greenback Slots – Big Win 1,000 Casino 
Therapeutic Lucky Koi Fish Satisfaction Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Omni 1,000 Education 
Pink SMS Keyboard Theme Diamond Ribbon 1,000 Beauty 
Hot Flame Evil Skull Keyboard Theme 1,000 Entertainment 
Gold Sequins Flip Keyboard Theme 1,000 Personalization 
3D Galaxy Earth Moon Parallax Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Kiosk Browser Lockdown 1,000 Business 
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Colorful Abstract Simple Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Panda Unicorn Star Galaxy Keyboard Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Gold Christmas Theme Wallpaper 1,000 Personalization 
Glow Neon Wolf Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Dark Neon Panther Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Multi Level Car Parking-Crazy Driving School 1,000 Simulation 
Cute Bear Keyboard Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Colorful Water Drop Flower Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Green Football Pitch Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Angry Flame Tiger Keyboard Theme 1,000 Personalization 
Golden Effiel Tower Keyboard Theme 1,000 Personalization 
TWICE WALLPAPER 2018 1,000 Personalization 
Graffiti Theme Street Art 1,000 Personalisation 
Gold Luxury Car Theme 1,000 Personalisation 
Twinkle Gemstone Theme 1,000 Personalisation 
The Konnected 500 Entertainment 
Golden Green Butterfly Theme 500 Personalization 
Nellore 500 News & Magazines 
Cool Rain Glass Waterdrop Theme 500 Personalization 
Tech Skull Red Live Keyboard 500 Personalization 
Horror Bloody Bat Theme 500 Personalization 
Snake Color Box Keyboard Theme 500 Personalization 
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Father Chritsmas Elk Theme 500 Personalization 
Purple Neon Business Theme 500 Personalization 
Modern Trade SFA- PepUpSales 500 Business 
New Year Pink Kitty Theme 100 Personalization 
Hoshiarpur 100 News & Magazines 
Brunet Swan Love keyboard 100 Personalization 
Radio Miel de Dios 100 Communication 
VP Tandem 100 Business 
Mandla 100 News & Magazines 
Fantasy Flowers Live Wallpaper 100 Personalization 
Sunlit Flowery Day Theme 100 Personalization 
Tiny Bowman Hero: Archery Rescue Challenge 100 Comics 
Cutie Bear Heart keyboard 100 Personalisation 
BIGG B 50 Music & Audio 
蒲公英 50 Photography 






Appendix B. Code Snippet for Cases 
Listing B1. Network 
1.     Class: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.util.aa 
2.     public static java.lang.String i(android.content.Context) 
3.     { 
4.         android.content.Context $r0; 
5.         java.lang.Object $r1; 
6.         android.telephony.TelephonyManager $r2; 
7.         int $i0; 
8.         java.lang.String $r3, $r4, $r6; 
9.         java.lang.StringBuilder $r5; 
10.         java.lang.Throwable $r7, $r8; 
11.  
12.         $r0 := @parameter0: android.content.Context; 
13.  
14.      label01: 
15.         $r1 = virtualinvoke $r0.<android.content.Context: java.lang.Object 
getSystemService(java.lang.String)>("phone"); 
16.  
17.      label02: 
18.         $r2 = (android.telephony.TelephonyManager) $r1; 
19.  
20.      label03: 






23.      label04: 
24.         if $i0 == 0 goto label05; 
25.  
26.         return ""; 
27.  
28.      label05: 
29.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r2.<android.telephony.TelephonyManager: java.lang.String 
getDeviceId()>(); 
30.  
31.      label06: 
32.         $r4 = $r3; 
33.  
34.         $r5 = new java.lang.StringBuilder; 
35.  
36.      label07: 
37.         specialinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>(); 
38.  
39.         $r5 = virtualinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>($r3); 
40.  
41.         $r5 = virtualinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>("device ID"); 
42.  
43.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r5.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String 
toString()>(); 
44.  
45.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("deviceIMEI", $r6); 
46.  
47.      label08: 
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48.         return $r3; 
49.  
50.      label09: 
51.         $r7 := @caughtexception; 
52.  
53.      label10: 
54.         virtualinvoke $r7.<java.lang.Exception: void printStackTrace()>(); 
55.  
56.         return $r4; 
57.  
58.      label11: 
59.         $r8 := @caughtexception; 
60.  
61.         $r4 = ""; 
62.  
63.         $r7 = $r8; 
64.  
65.         goto label10; 
66.  
67.         catch java.lang.Exception from label01 to label02 with label11; 
68.         catch java.lang.Exception from label03 to label04 with label11; 
69.         catch java.lang.Exception from label05 to label06 with label11; 
70.         catch java.lang.Exception from label07 to label08 with label09; 
71.     } 






Listing B2. Account 
1. Class: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.util.aa 
2.     public static java.lang.String f(android.content.Context) 
3.     { 
4.         android.content.Context $r0; 
5.         android.accounts.AccountManager $r1; 
6.         android.accounts.Account[] $r2; 
7.         java.lang.StringBuilder $r3; 
8.         int $i0, $i1; 
9.         java.lang.String $r4, $r6; 
10.         android.accounts.Account $r5; 
11.         boolean $z0; 
12.         java.lang.Throwable $r7, $r8; 
13.  
14.         $r0 := @parameter0: android.content.Context; 
15.  
16.      label01: 
17.         $r1 = staticinvoke <android.accounts.AccountManager: 
android.accounts.AccountManager get(android.content.Context)>($r0); 
18.  
19.         $r2 = virtualinvoke $r1.<android.accounts.AccountManager: 
android.accounts.Account[] getAccounts()>(); 
20.  
21.      label02: 
22.         $r3 = new java.lang.StringBuilder; 
23.  
24.      label03: 




27.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>("Size: "); 
28.  
29.      label04: 
30.         $i0 = lengthof $r2; 
31.  
32.      label05: 
33.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(int)>($i0); 
34.  
35.         $r4 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String 
toString()>(); 
36.  
37.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
e(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("PIKLOG", $r4); 
38.  
39.      label06: 
40.         $i0 = lengthof $r2; 
41.  
42.         $i1 = 0; 
43.  
44.      label07: 
45.         if $i1 >= $i0 goto label16; 
46.  
47.         $r5 = $r2[$i1]; 
48.  
49.         $r4 = $r5.<android.accounts.Account: java.lang.String name>; 
50.  




53.      label08: 
54.         $z0 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.String: boolean 
equals(java.lang.Object)>("com.google"); 
55.  
56.      label09: 
57.         if $z0 == 0 goto label12; 
58.  
59.         $r3 = new java.lang.StringBuilder; 
60.  
61.      label10: 
62.         specialinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>(); 
63.  
64.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>("Emails: "); 
65.  
66.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>($r4); 
67.  
68.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r3.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String 
toString()>(); 
69.  
70.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
e(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("PIKLOG", $r6); 
71.  
72.      label11: 
73.         return $r4; 
74.  
75.      label12: 




78.         goto label07; 
79.  
80.      label13: 
81.         $r7 := @caughtexception; 
82.  
83.         $r4 = null; 
84.  
85.         $r8 = $r7; 
86.  
87.      label14: 
88.         virtualinvoke $r8.<java.lang.Exception: void printStackTrace()>(); 
89.  
90.         return $r4; 
91.  
92.      label15: 
93.         $r8 := @caughtexception; 
94.  
95.         goto label14; 
96.  
97.      label16: 
98.         return null; 
99.  
100.         catch java.lang.Exception from label01 to label02 with label13; 
101.         catch java.lang.Exception from label03 to label04 with label13; 
102.         catch java.lang.Exception from label05 to label06 with label13; 
103.         catch java.lang.Exception from label08 to label09 with label13; 
104.         catch java.lang.Exception from label10 to label11 with label15; 




Listing B3. Location 
1. Class: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f 
2.     public android.location.Location a() 
3.     { 
4.         net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f $r0; 
5.         android.content.Context $r1; 
6.         java.lang.Object $r2; 
7.         android.location.LocationManager $r3; 
8.         boolean $z0; 
9.         android.os.Looper $r4; 
10.         android.location.Location $r5; 
11.         double $d0; 
12.         java.lang.StringBuilder $r6; 
13.         java.lang.String $r7; 
14.         java.lang.Throwable $r8, $r9, $r10; 
15.  
16.         $r0 := @this: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f; 
17.  
18.         $r1 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.content.Context h>; 
19.  
20.      label01: 
21.         $r2 = virtualinvoke $r1.<android.content.Context: java.lang.Object 
getSystemService(java.lang.String)>("location"); 
22.  
23.      label02: 




26.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g> = $r3; 
27.  
28.         $r3 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g>; 
29.  
30.      label03: 
31.         $z0 = virtualinvoke $r3.<android.location.LocationManager: boolean 
isProviderEnabled(java.lang.String)>("gps"); 
32.  
33.      label04: 
34.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: boolean a> = $z0; 
35.  
36.         $r3 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g>; 
37.  
38.      label05: 
39.         $z0 = virtualinvoke $r3.<android.location.LocationManager: boolean 
isProviderEnabled(java.lang.String)>("network"); 
40.  
41.      label06: 
42.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: boolean b> = $z0; 
43.  
44.         $z0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: boolean a>; 
45.  
46.         if $z0 != 0 goto label08; 
47.  
48.         $z0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: boolean b>; 
49.  




52.      label07: 
53.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d>; 
54.  
55.         return $r5; 
56.  
57.      label08: 
58.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: boolean c> = 1; 
59.  
60.         $z0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: boolean b>; 
61.  
62.         if $z0 == 0 goto label24; 
63.  
64.         $r3 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g>; 
65.  
66.      label09: 
67.         $r4 = staticinvoke <android.os.Looper: android.os.Looper getMainLooper()>(); 
68.  
69.         virtualinvoke $r3.<android.location.LocationManager: void 
requestLocationUpdates(java.lang.String,long,float,android.location.LocationLis
tener,android.os.Looper)>("network", 60000L, 10.0F, $r0, $r4); 
70.  
71.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("Network", "Network"); 
72.  
73.      label10: 





76.         if $r3 == null goto label24; 
77.  
78.         $r3 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g>; 
79.  
80.      label11: 
81.         $r5 = virtualinvoke $r3.<android.location.LocationManager: 
android.location.Location getLastKnownLocation(java.lang.String)>("network"); 
82.  
83.      label12: 
84.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d> = $r5; 
85.  
86.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d>; 
87.  
88.         if $r5 == null goto label24; 
89.  
90.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d>; 
91.  
92.      label13: 
93.         $d0 = virtualinvoke $r5.<android.location.Location: double getLatitude()>(); 
94.  
95.      label14: 
96.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double e> = $d0; 
97.  





100.      label15: 
101.         $d0 = virtualinvoke $r5.<android.location.Location: double getLongitude()>(); 
102.  
103.      label16: 
104.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double f> = $d0; 
105.  
106.         $r6 = new java.lang.StringBuilder; 
107.  
108.      label17: 
109.         specialinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>(); 
110.  
111.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>("latitude ["); 
112.  
113.      label18: 
114.         $d0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double e>; 
115.  
116.      label19: 
117.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(double)>($d0); 
118.  
119.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>(" ]"); 
120.  
121.         $r7 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String 
toString()>(); 
122.  





125.      label20: 
126.         $r6 = new java.lang.StringBuilder; 
127.  
128.      label21: 
129.         specialinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>(); 
130.  
131.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>("longitude ["); 
132.  
133.      label22: 
134.         $d0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double f>; 
135.  
136.      label23: 
137.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(double)>($d0); 
138.  
139.         $r6 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>(" ]"); 
140.  
141.         $r7 = virtualinvoke $r6.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String 
toString()>(); 
142.  
143.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("Lac", $r7); 
144.  
145.      label24: 
146.         $z0 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: boolean a>; 
147.  




150.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d>; 
151.  
152.         if $r5 != null goto label07; 
153.  
154.         $r3 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g>; 
155.  
156.      label25: 
157.         $r4 = staticinvoke <android.os.Looper: android.os.Looper getMainLooper()>(); 
158.  
159.         virtualinvoke $r3.<android.location.LocationManager: void 
requestLocationUpdates(java.lang.String,long,float,android.location.LocationLis
tener,android.os.Looper)>("gps", 60000L, 10.0F, $r0, $r4); 
160.  
161.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
d(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("GPS Enabled", "GPS Enabled"); 
162.  
163.      label26: 
164.         $r3 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g>; 
165.  
166.         if $r3 == null goto label07; 
167.  
168.         $r3 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.LocationManager g>; 
169.  
170.      label27: 
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171.         $r5 = virtualinvoke $r3.<android.location.LocationManager: 
android.location.Location getLastKnownLocation(java.lang.String)>("gps"); 
172.  
173.      label28: 
174.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d> = $r5; 
175.  
176.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d>; 
177.  
178.         if $r5 == null goto label07; 
179.  
180.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d>; 
181.  
182.      label29: 
183.         $d0 = virtualinvoke $r5.<android.location.Location: double getLatitude()>(); 
184.  
185.      label30: 
186.         $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: double e> = $d0; 
187.  
188.         $r5 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.services.f: 
android.location.Location d>; 
189.  
190.      label31: 
191.         $d0 = virtualinvoke $r5.<android.location.Location: double getLongitude()>(); 
192.  
193.      label32: 




196.         goto label07; 
197.  
198.      label33: 
199.         $r8 := @caughtexception; 
200.  
201.      label34: 
202.         virtualinvoke $r8.<java.lang.SecurityException: void printStackTrace()>(); 
203.  
204.      label35: 
205.         goto label07; 
206.  
207.      label36: 
208.         $r9 := @caughtexception; 
209.  
210.         virtualinvoke $r9.<java.lang.Exception: void printStackTrace()>(); 
211.  
212.         goto label07; 
213.  
214.      label37: 
215.         $r10 := @caughtexception; 
216.  
217.      label38: 
218.         virtualinvoke $r10.<java.lang.SecurityException: void printStackTrace()>(); 
219.  
220.      label39: 
221.         goto label24; 
222.  
223.         catch java.lang.Exception from label01 to label02 with label36; 
224.         catch java.lang.Exception from label03 to label04 with label36; 
225.         catch java.lang.Exception from label05 to label06 with label36; 
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226.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label09 to label10 with label37; 
227.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label11 to label12 with label37; 
228.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label13 to label14 with label37; 
229.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label15 to label16 with label37; 
230.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label17 to label18 with label37; 
231.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label19 to label20 with label37; 
232.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label21 to label22 with label37; 
233.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label23 to label24 with label37; 
234.         catch java.lang.Exception from label09 to label10 with label36; 
235.         catch java.lang.Exception from label11 to label12 with label36; 
236.         catch java.lang.Exception from label13 to label14 with label36; 
237.         catch java.lang.Exception from label15 to label16 with label36; 
238.         catch java.lang.Exception from label17 to label18 with label36; 
239.         catch java.lang.Exception from label19 to label20 with label36; 
240.         catch java.lang.Exception from label21 to label22 with label36; 
241.         catch java.lang.Exception from label23 to label24 with label36; 
242.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label25 to label26 with label33; 
243.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label27 to label28 with label33; 
244.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label29 to label30 with label33; 
245.         catch java.lang.SecurityException from label31 to label32 with label33; 
246.         catch java.lang.Exception from label25 to label26 with label36; 
247.         catch java.lang.Exception from label27 to label28 with label36; 
248.         catch java.lang.Exception from label29 to label30 with label36; 
249.         catch java.lang.Exception from label31 to label32 with label36; 
250.         catch java.lang.Exception from label34 to label35 with label36; 
251.         catch java.lang.Exception from label38 to label39 with label36; 




Listing B4. Database 
1. Class: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService 
2.     private boolean a(java.lang.String) 
3.     { 
4.         
net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService 
$r0; 
5.         java.lang.String $r1, $r3; 
6.         java.lang.StringBuilder $r2; 
7.         net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b $r4; 
8.         int $i0; 
9.  
10.         $r0 := @this: 
net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService; 
11.  
12.         $r1 := @parameter0: java.lang.String; 
13.  
14.         $r2 = new java.lang.StringBuilder; 
15.  
16.         specialinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: void <init>()>(); 
17.  
18.         $r2 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>("oldpassword ["); 
19.  
20.         $r3 = specialinvoke 
$r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingSer




22.         $r2 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>($r3); 
23.  
24.         $r2 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.StringBuilder 
append(java.lang.String)>("]"); 
25.  
26.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r2.<java.lang.StringBuilder: java.lang.String 
toString()>(); 
27.  
28.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
i(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("MyFirebaseMsgService", $r3); 
29.  
30.         staticinvoke <android.util.Log: int 
i(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("MyFirebaseMsgService", "oldpassword and 
newpassword matches. save new password"); 
31.  
32.         $r4 = 
<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService
: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b a>; 
33.  
34.         $i0 = virtualinvoke $r4.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b: int 
c(java.lang.String)>($r1); 
35.  
36.         $r4 = 
<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService
: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b a>; 
37.  
38.         virtualinvoke $r4.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b: void b()>(); 
39.  




42.         return 1; 
43.  
44.      label1: 
45.         return 0; 
46.     } 
47. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
48.     Class: 
net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService 
49.     private java.lang.String a() 
50.     { 
51.         
net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService 
$r0; 
52.         java.lang.String $r1; 
53.         net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b $r2; 
54.  
55.         $r0 := @this: 
net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService; 
56.  
57.         $r2 = 
<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.firebasenotify.MyFirebaseMessagingService
: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b a>; 
58.  
59.         $r1 = virtualinvoke $r2.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b: 
java.lang.String e()>(); 
60.  
61.         return $r1; 




64.     Class: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b 
65.     public java.lang.String e() 
66.     { 
67.         net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b $r0; 
68.         android.database.sqlite.SQLiteDatabase $r1; 
69.         java.lang.String[] $r2; 
70.         android.database.Cursor $r3; 
71.         boolean $z0; 
72.         int $i0; 
73.         java.lang.String $r4; 
74.  
75.         $r0 := @this: net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b; 
76.  
77.         $r1 = $r0.<net.intricare.gobrowserkiosklockdown.b.b: 
android.database.sqlite.SQLiteDatabase b>; 
78.  
79.         $r2 = newarray (java.lang.String)[1]; 
80.  
81.         $r2[0] = "password"; 
82.  
83.         $r3 = virtualinvoke $r1.<android.database.sqlite.SQLiteDatabase: 
android.database.Cursor 
query(java.lang.String,java.lang.String[],java.lang.String,java.lang.String[],j
ava.lang.String,java.lang.String,java.lang.String)>("login", $r2, null, null, 
null, null, null); 
84.  
85.         $z0 = interfaceinvoke $r3.<android.database.Cursor: boolean moveToFirst()>(); 
86.  




89.         $i0 = interfaceinvoke $r3.<android.database.Cursor: int 
getColumnIndex(java.lang.String)>("password"); 
90.  
91.         $r4 = interfaceinvoke $r3.<android.database.Cursor: java.lang.String 
getString(int)>($i0); 
92.  
93.         return $r4; 
94.  
95.      label1: 
96.         return null; 
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